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Abstract
In a neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition in the product
market, the presence of cyclical factor utilization enhances the stabilization role
of countercyclical taxes. The costs of varying capital utilization take the form of
varying rates of depreciation, which in turn have amplifying eﬀect on investment
decisions as well as the volatility of most aggregate variables. This creates an
additional channel through which taxes aﬀect the economy, a channel that enhances
the stabilization role of countercyclical taxes, with particularly strong eﬀects in the
labor market. However, in terms of welfare, countercyclical taxes are welfare inferior
due to reduced precautionary saving motives.
• JEL Classification: E62, E32
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the stabilization role and welfare consequences of countercyclical
tax policy in an environment characterized by the presence of monopolistic competition
and cyclical factor utilization.
Countercyclical fiscal policies are generally believed to have stabilizing eﬀects which
help smooth out business cycle fluctuations.1 There is also a consensus that this type
of policy is most eﬀective when it works via automatic stabilizers, which do not require
active intervention from policy makers and therefore do not suﬀer from implementation
lags. The focus of this paper is on the automatic stabilizer element of tax policy:
the government in the model economy adopts an endogenous simple rule where, in a
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1See, for example, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Cohen and Follette (2000), Taylor (2000), Jones
(2002), Auerbach (2003), Auerbach (2005), Kletzer (2006), Kim and Kim (2006).
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manner which mimics the progressivity of the tax system, the income tax rate responds
positively to contemporaneous output fluctuations. In a recession, the reduced income
implies lower income tax rates, which attenuate the negative eﬀects of the economic
downturn. The policy is evaluated for a range of empirically relevant parameters values.
Faced with temporary changes in economic conditions, firms may first choose to use
their existing factors of production more intensively, potentially due to the high costs of
adjusting factor inputs along the extensive margin. While not explicitly modeled here, it
is believed that the costs of hiring employees or of adding new equipment to production
lines are significant. The variation in the degree of factor utilization becomes an optimal
decision and will depend on existing and expected government policies.
Here, the focus is restricted to the case of varying capital utilization. A more in-
tensive use of the existing capital stock incurs costs in the form of higher rates of
depreciation, which in turn has an amplifying eﬀect on investment decisions as well as
the volatility of most aggregate variables. This creates an additional channel through
which taxes aﬀect equilibrium outcomes, a channel that enhances the stabilization role
of countercyclical taxes.
While it is generally true that countercyclical taxes reduce the volatility of some
aggregate variables like output, investment, and consumption, these eﬀects are larger in
the presence of cyclical factor utilization. Furthermore, employment variability is now
reduced when taxes are countercyclical for all plausible parameter configurations. This
stands in contrast with the standard model without varying capital utilization, where
countercyclical taxes have little stabilizing eﬀect in the labor market and only for low
values of the income elasticity of the tax rate.
Considering the welfare implications of such policies, there is a direct welfare benefit
from the reduced volatility. However, when people take direct account of the level of
uncertainty when making decisions, then the reduced volatility lowers the precautionary
saving motive, which reduces capital accumulation and, therefore, consumption in the
long run. This negative mean eﬀect outweighs the gains from stabilization, thus making
countercyclical taxes welfare reducing. And while the enhanced stabilization role of
countercyclical taxes under capital utilization brings a stronger welfare benefit, it also
implies a larger welfare loss due to the relatively lower average long-run consumption,
as compared to the standard model.
The real business cycle literature has focused on the role of cyclical factor utilization
as a propagation mechanism of business cycle shocks, identifying either varying capital
utilization (see Taubman and Wilkinson (1970) and Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀ-
man (1988)) or labor hoarding (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993)) as playing
this role.2 Along the same dimensions but in a model of monetary policy, Christiano,
2The theoretical and empirical consequences of variable utilization of both capital and labor have
been addressed in work by Bils and Cho (1994), Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), and Basu and Kimball
(1997).
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Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) find variable capital utilization to be an important fea-
ture (alongside staggered wage contracts) in explaining inflation inertia and persistence
output movements in response to a monetary policy shock.
The results of this paper highlight the importance of cyclical capital utilization for
the eﬀectiveness of tax policy.
The next section lays out the model, the solution method, and the choice of para-
meter values used in simulations. The results are contained in section three and the last
section concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a perfectly competitive final goods sector, a monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods sector, households, and the government. There is one
composite good used for consumption and investment and a continuum of diﬀerentiated
goods used as inputs in the production of the final good.
2.1 The Private Sector
The Final Goods Sector Final goods are produced by an infinite number of firms
in a perfectly competitive market, using an aggregator function of the Dixit-Stiglitz type
Yt =
µZ 1
0
Y
−1

it di
¶ 
−1
, (1)
where Yit is the amount of intermediate good i and  is the constant elasticity of sub-
stitution between intermediate goods. The markup, denoted by μ = −1 , represents
the degree of monopoly power of intermediate goods producers. Taking prices as given
and subject to the available technology, firms choose intermediate goods to maximize
profits, Πt = Yt −
R 1
0 PitYitdi. The first order condition yields the following demand for
intermediate goods
Yit = P−it Yt, ∀i. (2)
which has a constant price elasticity that is inversely related to the markup, μ. The
aggregate price level, normalized to unity, can then be expressed as 1 =
³R 1
0 P
1−
it di
´ 1
1− .
The Intermediate Goods Sector The intermediate sector comprises of a con-
tinuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed by i and of measure 1. Each firm
i produces a unique good using labor (Hit) and eﬀective units of capital (uitKit−1):
Yit = zt (uitKit−1)αH1−αit − φ, α ∈ (0, 1) .
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Total factor productivity, zt, aﬀects all firms symmetrically and follows an exogenous
stationary process, ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εzt , with persistence parameter ρz ∈ (0, 1) and
random shocks εzt ∼ iidN
¡
0, σ2z
¢
.
Optimally, the price of good i is set at a markup over marginal cost
Pit = μMCit = μ
µ
Ωrαt w
1−α
t
1
zt
¶
where Ω ≡
h
α−α (1− α)α−1
i
. The choices of capital and labor inputs are such that their
marginal products exceed rental prices by the same constant markup μ. (See Appendix
A for more details.)
Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, the firm specific capital, the capital utilization
rate, and employment are the same across firms (Kit−1 = Kt−1, uit = ut, Hit = Ht) and
the aggregate final goods production can be expressed as
Yt = Ft − φ
where Ft ≡ zt (utKt−1)αH1−αt denotes aggregate output inclusive of fixed costs. Aggre-
gate profits of intermediate producers, πt =
³
1− 1μ
´
Ft − φ, are rebated to households
in lump-sum fashion.
Households The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households,
each of which derives utility from consumption of final goods and leisure. At the begin-
ning of every period, households rent labor and units of eﬀective capital to intermediate
goods producing firms. At the end of the period, they receive from firms capital rental
payments, wages, and dividends, all of which are being taxed by the government at a
single income tax rate, τ t. Also included in the household income is the undepreciated
capital stock, while lump-sum taxes further reduce the available income, which can be
expressed as:
It = (1− τ t) (rtutKt−1 + wtHt + πt) + (1− δt)Kt−1 − Tt. (3)
In response to changes in economic conditions, the existing capital stock can be used
more or less intensively. Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988), it is
assumed that when capital is used more intensively, it will also depreciate more, hence a
direct relationship between the utilization and depreciation rates of capital of the form
δt =
1
ϕ
uϕt , ϕ > 1.
3 (4)
The choice of the capital utilization rate is modeled on the side of capital owners, i.e.
3Similar specifications can be found in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) and Arias, Hansen, and
Ohanian (2007).
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the households. Implicit in this setup is the assumption that households and firms
can trade state-contingent rental contracts on capital, specifying the quantity of capital
traded and the rental rate. In equilibrium, the capital rental rate depends on the rate
of capital utilization.
The representative household chooses consumption, Ct, capital, Kt, the utilization
rate of the existing capital stock, ut, and hours worked, Ht, to maximize expected
lifetime utility:
max
{Ct,Ht,ut,Kt,Bt}∞t=0
E0
∞X
t=0
βt U (Ct, 1−Ht)
subject to the budget constraint (3) and the capital depreciation relation (4).
The optimal capital utilization rate is given by the first order condition:
(1− τ t) rt = ϕ
δt
ut
.
This, together with the first order condition for labor, the Euler equation for consump-
tion and the transversality condition for capital, characterize the households’ optimal
choices. (See Appendix A for the detailed expressions.)
2.2 The Government
The government consumes an exogenous amount of final goods, that it finances via a
mix of distortionary and lump-sum taxes. The period government budget constraint is
then
Gt = τ tYt + Tt (5)
where Gt represents government consumption, τ tYt distortionary tax revenues, and Tt
lump-sum taxes. Government consumption follows a stationary AR(1) process, lnGt =
(1− ρG) lnG + ρG lnGt−1 + εGt , with persistence parameter ρG ∈ (0, 1) and random
shocks εGt ∼ iidN
¡
0, σ2G
¢
.
The income tax rate τ t responds to contemporaneous output fluctuations as follows
ln τ t = d+ θ lnYt, θ ≥ 0. (6)
where d is a constant term. The dependence of the tax rate on output reflects the stabi-
lization aspect of tax policy which occurs automatically, without systematic intervention
from policy makers. In a broad way, the policy is reflective of a progressive tax system.
A positive θ indicates a countercyclical tax policy, an automatic response of the tax
rate, which declines during recessions and increases during booms.
2.3 Equilibrium
A symmetric equilibrium for this economy can be defined as follows:
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Definition 1 A symmetric equilibrium is an allocation sequence {Ct,Ht,Kt, ut, δt}∞t=0,
a price sequence {Pt, wt, rt}∞t=0, a sequence of government policy variables {Gt, τ t}∞t=0,
and initial conditions {K−1, z0} such that:
(i) given prices, government policies, and initial conditions, the allocation sequence
solves the households’ utility maximization problem and the final goods producers’ profit
maximization problem,
(ii) given factor prices, government policies, and initial conditions, the allocation
sequence and the price sequence {Pt}∞t=0 solve the profit maximization problem of inter-
mediate goods producing firms,
(iii) fiscal policy variables follow the specified processes and the government budget
constraint is satisfied at all times, and
(iv) all markets clear.
2.4 The Solution
In the absence of a closed-form solution, the equilibrium conditions are approximated
around the deterministic steady state. To compute welfare, a second-order accurate
solution of the model was employed, using the algorithm in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004).
2.5 Model Calibration
The model is calibrated to a quarterly frequency and follows the usual parameterization
in the literature.4 Table 1 gives some of the assumed and implied parameter values. The
relative weight on leisure, χ, is such that the proportion of time spent working averages
20%. The capital depreciation rate δ matches the average investment-output ratio of
0.17 in the U.S. data (1947:1-2005:4). The implied average capital utilization rate u is
0.108 and the corresponding parameter ϕ equals 1.65. The fixed cost parameter φ is such
that profits are zero in the steady-state. With a markup value μ of 1.4, the degree of
monopolistic competition is moderate, in the context of a range 1.1 to 2.4 identified in
the literature and, furthermore, consistent with values most commonly encountered in
real models. Productivity shocks are persistent with ρz = 0.95 and standard deviation
σz = 0.006. For the government spending process, the first-order correlation ρG is set
to 0.925 and the standard deviation σG to 0.014. The average marginal income tax rate
τ is set at 0.22.5
The elasticity of the tax rate with respect to output, θ, is allowed to vary in the
[0, 2] range. This parameter represents the magnitude of the endogenous response of the
income tax rate to output fluctuations, i.e. how countercyclical tax policy is. The specific
4See, for example, Braun (1994), Jones (2002), Trabandt and Uhlig (2006), and Leeper and Yang
(2008).
5This value of τ lies in the range of estimates in the literature: Akhand and Liu (2002) give a rate
of approximately 0.2, while Braun (1994) and Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) report a value of 0.25.
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range reflects available evidence: Blanchard and Perotti (2002) rely on institutional
information to estimate the quarterly elasticity of tax revenues with respect to output
and obtain an average over the post-war period of 2.08, with specific values ranging from
1.58 in 1947:Q1 to 1.63 in 1960:Q1 to 2.92 in 1997:Q4. This implies an average value of
θ of approximately 1 with plausible values of almost 2. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000)
and Cohen and Follette (2000) give similar estimates.6
3 Discussion
The economic environment considered here is characterized by the presence of market
power and variable capital utilization. In combination with the dynamics induced by the
government’s tax policy, this aspect will prove important for the stabilization properties
of countercyclical taxes.
Monopolistic competition changes the relative weight of the income and substitu-
tion eﬀects that arise from shocks to the economy. As firms set prices above marginal
costs and make profits on the margin, any increase in output exceeds the corresponding
increase in real labor costs.7 Consequently, changes in employment tend to be lower,
while variations in output, consumption, and investment are larger.
Allowing for variable capital utilization tends to amplify the responses of aggregate
variables to shocks. A change in the degree to which the existing capital stock is utilized
impacts directly on its rate of depreciation and therefore on the choice of investment
and work eﬀort. This represents an additional channel through which stabilization
tax policies of the type specified here can aﬀect the economy. For illustration of the
mechanism at work, the next subsection presents the responses of key macroeconomic
variables to exogenous technology and government spending shocks.
3.1 Impulse Responses to Exogenous Shocks
A Positive Technology Shock A persistent increase in technology raises the de-
mand for capital services and labor. Higher wages make households substitute current
work for future leisure. Capital is used more intensively which causes additional changes
in employment, due to the complementarity in production between the two factors. At
the same time, the rate of capital depreciation increases, causing the need for additional
investment. Overall, there is a strong rise in equilibrium employment, output, con-
sumption and investment, of a larger magnitude than in the absence of varying capital
utilization.
6Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) use the TAXSIM model of tax returns to provide annual evidence
on the change in the income tax rate for a one percent change in income. This implies an approximate
value of θ between 0.32 and 0.92.
7See Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), and Benassy (2002) for
detailed expositions on monopolistic competition.
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When taxes are countercyclical, the increased output leads to a contemporaneous
increase in the income tax rate, which has adverse eﬀects on all aggregate variables.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses associated with a positive technology shock, under
constant taxes (θ = 0, solid lines) and countercyclical taxes (θ = 1, dash lines). The
higher tax rate reduces the positive income eﬀect via higher tax payments but also lowers
after-tax real wages and capital rental rates. The substitution eﬀect dominates and the
positive response of employment is significantly reduced and so is the increase in output.
With θ = 1, hours worked still increase on impact but decline below the long-run average
within a year. 8 Persistence of the shock creates expectations of higher future tax rates
and lower expected after-tax rates of return on capital, which diminish the change in
investment.
In addition, the increase in tax rate lowers the intensity with which the existing
capital stock is being utilized, which in turn reduces its depreciation rate. This has the
eﬀect of further reducing the need for investment and hence the need for extra hours of
work. It represents the additional channel through which countercyclical taxes have a
stabilizing eﬀect on the economy.
A Positive Government Spending Shock Exogenous and persistent increases
in government spending reduce the present value of privately available after-tax income
and determine an increase in the labor supply which leads to higher equilibrium em-
ployment and output. Due to the complementarity between factors in production, the
rise in employment determines an increase in the degree of capital utilization. With
changes in both factor inputs, the increase in output is slightly larger than in the stan-
dard model without varying capital utilization. However, there is still a crowding out
eﬀect of private consumption. With the existing capital being used more intensively, its
depreciation rate rises which creates an incentive to save more. However, the negative
income eﬀect is strong enough to cause a decline in investment. Figure 2 illustrates the
impulse responses of key variables of interest.
In the presence of countercyclical taxes, there is an increase of the income tax rate
associated with the above-average level of output. The higher tax rate has adverse eﬀects
on both hours worked and the degree of capital utilization. Consequently, the change in
output is significantly diminished, while the crowding out eﬀects on consumption and
investment are exacerbated.
3.2 Stabilization Eﬀects
The conventional notion of stabilization policies is that they reduce the volatility of
aggregate variables, and especially the volatility of output. However, as households are
8 In this environment, employment can actually decline contemporaneously in response to a positive
technology shock when taxes are countercyclical. The presence of market power enhances this eﬀect.
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primarily concerned with the utility derived from the consumption of various quantities
(including leisure), the volatility of consumption and hours worked is of high relevance.
In the current model, and consistent with the conventional wisdom, countercyclical
tax policies reduce output volatility measured as the standard deviation of fluctua-
tions around the long-run average. Countercyclical taxes are also found to decrease
the volatility of investment and consumption. Allowing for intensive capital utilization
creates an additional channel through which taxes aﬀect equilibrium outcomes, a chan-
nel that enhances the stabilization role of countercyclical taxes. Figure 3 shows the
percent changes in aggregate volatility induced by a countercyclical tax (θ > 0) rela-
tive to a non-countercyclical tax (θ = 0) in the model with and without variable capital
utilization. It is easily noticeable that, in the presence of intensive capital utilization,
countercyclical taxes have a stronger positive eﬀect on volatility. For θ equal to 1, for
example, the volatility of these variables is reduced by about 20-30% in the basic model
and by 30-40% in the model of capital utilization.
With respect to employment however, the stabilizing eﬀects of countercyclical income
tax rates are vastly diﬀerent when variable capital utilization is taken into consideration
and results are a lot more sensitive to the values of the progressivity parameter θ. Em-
ployment volatility is generally a non-monotonic function of θ, decreasing for relatively
smaller responses of the tax rate to output fluctuations, and then increasing as these
endogenous changes become larger. In the basic model without capital utilization, the
stabilizing eﬀects of countercyclical taxes on employment are very small and limited to
the lower range of θ values. In fact, fluctuations in hours worked increase for most values
of θ. The picture changes significantly when variable factor utilization is allowed for:
countercyclical taxes reduce employment volatility by up to 35%, for the entire range of
θ values considered. This is an important aspect in light of the fact that the variability
of hours worked has direct implications for welfare, as shown below.
3.3 Welfare Implications
This section examines the welfare implications of the tax policy. Although counter-
cyclical taxes reduce the volatility of most economic variables, they may have negative
welfare eﬀects if agents take direct account of the level of uncertainty when making
decisions.
Welfare is measured as the unconditional expectations of lifetime utility, based on a
second-order solution to the model. The use of a second-order solution was prompted
by the findings that linear models, which abstract from the eﬀects of uncertainty on
optimal decisions, may lead to spurious welfare results (Kim and Kim (2003)). Let W r
denote welfare under the reference regime of constant tax rates
W r = E
∞X
t=0
βtU (Crt ,H
r
t ) .
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An alternative regimes of countercyclical taxes yields welfare W a. Following Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2006), the welfare benefit, ξ, of countercyclical tax policy is expressed
as the fraction of the consumption process under the non-countercyclical policy (or
reference) regime that households must be given in order to be equally happy under the
two types of tax policy:
W a = E
∞X
t=0
βtU (Cat ,H
a
t ) = E
∞X
t=0
βtU ((1 + ξ)Crt ,H
r
t )
A positive ξ means that the alternative regime welfare dominates the reference one. With
logarithmic utility in both consumption and leisure, the expression for ξ in percentage
terms is
ξ = [exp ((1− β) (W a −W r))− 1]× 100. (7)
To obtain a measure of welfare, the momentary utility function is approximated
by a second-order Taylor expansion, which gives an expression in which period-t util-
ity depends on percent deviations and percent squared deviations of consumption and
hours worked from the deterministic steady state (Appendix B shows the more general
expression):
Wt = E0
∞X
t=0
βtU (Ct,Ht)
=
U
1− β +E0
∞X
t=0
βt
∙
Cˆt − χ
H
1−HHˆt
¸
+E0
∞X
t=0
βt
1
2
∙
−χ H
(1−H)2
¸
Hˆ2t . (8)
Optimal decisions depend both on the levels of state variables and on the amount of
uncertainty in the economy. With greater uncertainty, risk-averse agents increase their
savings and accumulate more of the available asset, which is capital in this economy.
This raises the long-run level of the capital stock, output, and consumption, although in
the short run agents would possibly have to work more and consume less. The welfare
measure can therefore be decomposed into a first-order component, due to changes in the
means of consumption and leisure, and a second-order component, due to the magnitude
of fluctuations in these variables:
WFirstOrdert =
U
1− β +E0
∞X
t=0
βt
∙
Cˆt − χ
H
1−HHˆt
¸
WSecondOrdert =
U
1− β +E0
∞X
t=0
βt
1
2
∙
−χ H
(1−H)2
¸
Hˆ2t .9
The welfare cost of each component
¡
ξFirstOrder, ξSecondOrder
¢
can be determined by
9Similar decompositions can be found in Kollmann (2002), Kim and Kim (2006), and Bergin, Shin,
and Tchakarov (2007).
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applying the formula in expression (7).10
Table 2 shows that welfare in a stochastic economy with countercyclical tax policies
(θ > 0) is lower than when tax rates do not change with output (θ = 0). As shown in
the previous section, countercyclical taxes have a stabilizing eﬀect in the economy by
reducing aggregate volatility. With the logarithmic specification of utility adopted here,
the element that directly aﬀects welfare is the volatility of hours worked which decreases
under countercyclical taxes and varying capital utilization. This is reflected in the pos-
itive second-order component ξSecondOrder. In the basic model, ξSecondOrder is generally
negative, indicating increased volatility and lower welfare. The welfare benefits/costs of
reduced volatility are expectedly small and comparable with those obtained by Lucas
(1987). Overall, uncertainty is lower in the economy with countercyclical taxes. Less
uncertainty reduces the precautionary saving motive and results in lower capital accu-
mulation and therefore consumption in the long run. This mean eﬀect, captured in the
negative values of ξFirstOrder outweighs the stabilization eﬀects and make countercycli-
cal taxes welfare reducing. For an income elasticity of the tax rate of 1.0, the overall
welfare costs are 0.037% in the basic model and 0.077% in the model of cyclical factor
utilization. While the enhanced stabilization role of countercyclical taxes under capital
utilization is a stronger welfare benefit, it also implies a larger welfare loss due to lower
average long-run consumption.
In an economy where uncertainty matters, the long-run level of the economy will
diﬀer according to the degree of uncertainty and the implied accumulation of capital.
Accordingly, the average tax level will be diﬀerent. Simulation results indicate that,
the more countercyclical the tax rate, the higher is average marginal tax. While this
is a feature of progressive tax systems, it represents a second source of lower long-run
consumption under countercyclical taxes. In welfare calculations, it strengthens the
mean eﬀect.
4 Conclusion
This paper examined the stabilization role of countercyclical taxes in a neoclassical
growth model with monopolistic competition and cyclical factor utilization. The coun-
tercyclical aspect of tax policy is defined by the automatic response of the average mar-
ginal income tax rate to output fluctuations, capturing the progressivity of tax systems.
Allowing for varying capital utilization creates an additional channel through which
taxes aﬀect the economy, a channel that enhances the stabilization role of countercycli-
cal taxes. Furthermore, and diﬀerent from the basic model without capital utilization,
countercyclical taxes reduce the volatility of hours worked.
Countercyclical taxes are however welfare reducing, when the amount of uncertainty
10Numerically, all welfare measures are computed using the unconditional first and second moments
of consumption and labor, which are obtained from the solution method.
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in the economy directly aﬀects optimal decisions. While the reduced level of uncertainty
has a positive eﬀect on welfare, it also leads to lower precautionary saving motive and
lower long-run consumption. This latter eﬀect dominates in welfare calculations.
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A Analytical Details
A.1 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The optimization problem of the monopolistically competitive firm is split into two
parts: a constrained cost minimization problem and a constrained profit maximization
problem.
The firm chooses labor and eﬀective units of capital to minimize the cost of produc-
tion subject to the available technology
C (rt, wt, Yit, φ) = min
kit−1,hit
[rtuitKit−1 + wtHit]
s.t. zt (uitKit−1)αH1−αit = Fit + φ
Define Fit ≡ Yit + φ as the total output (inclusive of fixed costs) that each firm i
produces. The fixed costs φ are in terms of the produced good i. Use the constraint
to solve for Hit, Hit =
h
Fit
zt (uitKit−1)
−α
i 1
(1−α) , and then substitute for it in the cost
minimization problem. The resulting demand functions for labor and eﬀective units of
capital are:
uitKit−1 =
∙
αwt
(1− α) rt
¸1−αµFit
zt
¶
(9)
and
Hit =
∙
αwt
(1− α) rt
¸−αµFit
zt
¶
. (10)
The total cost function is then:
TCit ≡ C (rt, wt, Yit, φ) = rtuitKit−1 +wtHit
=
h
α−α (1− α)1−α
i
rαt w
1−α
t
µ
Fit
zt
¶
= Ωrαt w
1−α
t
µ
Fit
zt
¶
where Ω ≡
h
α−α (1− α)α−1
i
. The marginal cost follows directly:
MCit =
∂C (rt, wt, Yit, φ)
∂Yit
= Ωrαt w
1−α
t z
−1
t
Then, given the minimum total cost of production and the demand for its own good
(2), each firm i,∀i, chooses the price of its good Pit to maximize profits:
max
Pit
πit = PitYit − C (rt, wt, Yit, φ)
s.t. Yit = P−it Yt
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FOC (Pit) : Yit + Pit ∂Yit∂Pit −
∂C(rkt ,wt,Yit,φ)
∂Yit
∂Yit
∂Pit
= 0
Re-arrange the first order condition to obtain the characteristic relationship of a
markup of the price over marginal cost:
Pit = μMCit. (11)
The final step is to combine equations (9), (10), and (11) to derive the optimal choices
of capital and labor given both the technology constraint and the demand constraint:
Pit
∙
α
Fit
uitKit−1
¸
= μrt
and
Pit
∙
(1− α) Fit
Hit
¸
= μwt.
A.2 The Households’ Utility Maximization
The solution to the problem is obtained by solving the Lagrangian function below,
where the function describing the dynamics of the depreciation rate has already been
substituted in:
L = E0
∞X
t=0
βt
(
U (Ct, 1−Ht)− λt
"
Ct +Kt − (1− τ t) (rtutKt−1 + wtHt +Ntπt)
−
³
1− 1ϕu
ϕ
t
´
Kt−1 + Tt
#)
FOCs:
(Ct) : U1(Ct, 1−Ht) = λt
(Ht) : U2 (Ct, 1−Ht) = U1(Ct, 1−Ht) (1− τ t)wt
(ut) : (1− τ t) rt = uϕ−1t
(Kt) : U1(Ct, 1−Ht) = βEtU1(Ct+1, 1−Ht+1) [(1− τ t+1) rt+1ut+1 + 1− δt+1]
TV C (Kt) : lim
T→∞
βTEtU1(Ct+T , 1−Ht+T )Kt+T = 0
With utility given by U (C, 1−H) = log (C)+χ log (1−H), the first derivatives are
U1 (C, 1−H) =
1
C
and U2 (C, 1−H) = χ
1
1−H
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A.3 System of Non-linear Equations
The system of equations characterizing the dynamics of this equilibrium comprises of:
U2 (Ct, 1−Ht) = U1(Ct, 1−Ht) (1− τ t)wt
(1− τ t) rt = uϕ−1t
U1(Ct, 1−Ht) = βEtU1(Ct+1, 1−Ht+1) [(1− τ t+1) rt+1ut+1 + 1− δt+1]
rt =
1
μ
µ
α
Ft
utKt−1
¶
wt =
1
μ
∙
(1− α) Ft
Ht−1
¸
Xt = Kt − (1− δt)Kt−1
δt =
1
ϕ
uϕt
Yt = Ft − φ
Ft = zt (utKt−1)αH1−αt
Yt = Ct +Xt +Gt
Gt = τ tYt + Tt.
A.4 The Deterministic Steady State
The non-stochastic long-run equilibrium is characterized by constant real variables and
nominal variables growing at a constant rate. Assuming all profits are zero in the long
run implies a value of the fixed costs of
φ =
µ
1− 1
μ
¶
F
and then aggregate output can be written as:
Y =
1
μ
F =
1
μ
£
z (uK)αH1−α
¤
. (12)
The rest of the equilibrium conditions reduce to:
U2 (C, 1−H) = U1 (C, 1−H) [(1− τ)w] (13)
(1− τ) r = uϕ−1 (14)
1 = β [(1− τ) ru+ 1− δ] (15)
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r =
1
μ
µ
α
F
uK
¶
= α
Y
uK
(16)
w =
1
μ
∙
(1− α) F
H
¸
= (1− α) Y
H
. (17)
X = δK ⇒ δ = X
K
δ =
1
ϕ
uϕ (18)
C
Y
= 1− X
Y
− G
Y
To obtain an expression for the depreciation rate, combine the first order conditions
for capital from the household’s problem (15) and the intermediate firms’ problem (16):
δ =
∙
(1− τ)αY
X
− 1
¸−1 ¡
β−1 − 1
¢
.
Use the first order condition (14) together with the firms’ first order condition for
capital (16) and the depreciation rate equation (18) to find ϕ, the factor defining the
degree to which capital utilization aﬀects capital depreciation:
ϕ = (1− τ)αY
X
.
Then, the utilization rate obtains directly from equation (18).
The steady state capital stock is determined using the definition of aggregate output
(12) in conjunction with the capital-output ratio
¡K
Y =
X
Y
1
δ
¢
and the assumed value of
steady state employment
K =
∙
1
μ
¡
zuαH1−α
¢ K
Y
¸ 1
1−α
.
Given the definition of aggregate output, equations (16) and (17) give the capital rental
rate r and the real wage rate w, while aggregate consumption, investment and gov-
ernment spending obtain as
¡C
Y
¢
Y ,
¡X
Y
¢
Y , and
¡G
Y
¢
Y . Finally, solve (13) for χ to
get
χ = (1− τ)w1−H
C
.
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B Approximation of the Utility Function
To calculate the welfare associated with a given fiscal policy rule, the momentary utility
is approximated by a second-order Taylor expansion. First, take a second-order Taylor
expansion of U (Ct,Ht) with respect to (Ct,Ht) around the deterministic steady state
values C,H and express it in algebraic percent deviations:
U (Ct,Ht) ≈ U +
£
UC
¡
C,H
¢
C
¤ dCt
C
+
£
UH
¡
C,H
¢
H
¤ dHt
H
+
+
1
2
⎧
⎨
⎩
h
UCC
¡
C,H
¢
C2
i ³
dCt
C
´2
+ 2
£
UCH
¡
C,H
¢
C H
¤ ³dCt
C
´³
dht
H
´
+
h
UHH
¡
C,H
¢
H2
i ³
dHt
H
´2
⎫
⎬
⎭
Then, following Woodford (2003), approximate the algebraic percent change by a
second-order expansion in terms of logarithmic changes
xt − x
x
=
dxt
x
≈ xˆt +
1
2
xˆ2t where : xˆt ≡ lnxt − lnx
Finally, substitute the logarithmic changes for the algebraic percent changes and
keep only the terms of order O(1) and lower to get
U (Ct,Ht) ≈ U +
£
UC
¡
C,H
¢
C
¤ bCt + £UH ¡C,H¢ H¤ bHt+
+
1
2
⎧
⎨
⎩
h
UCC
¡
C,H
¢
C2 + UC
¡
C,H
¢
C
i bC2t + 2 £UCH ¡C,H¢ C H¤ ³ bCt bHt´
+
h
UHH
¡
C,H
¢
H2 + UH
¡
C,H
¢
H
i bH2t
⎫
⎬
⎭ .
Given the functional form adopted here, the approximation reduces to:
U (Ct,Ht) ≈ U + bCt − χ H
1−H
bHt − 1
2
∙
χ
H
(1−H)2
¸ bH2t
which is equation (8) in the text. Note that, when the momentary utility is logarithmic
in consumption, the variability of consumption does not directly aﬀect lifetime utility
(the last term in the last equation only includes the squared value of percent deviations
in hours worked).
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.99 τ 0.22
χ 3.16 ρG 0.925
α 0.36 σG 0.014
φ 0.05 ρz 0.95
δ 0.015 σz 0.006
u 0.108 μ 1.4
ϕ 1.65 θ [0, 2]
G/Y 0.2
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations
Total (ξ) Mean Eﬀect
¡
ξFirstOrder
¢
Second Order Eﬀect
¡
ξSecondOrder
¢
Basic Model
θ = 1.0 vs. θ = 0.0 -0.037 -0.037 ~0
θ = 2.0 vs. θ = 0.0 -0.063 -0.060 -0.003
θ = 2.0 vs. θ = 1.0 -0.026 -0.023 -0.003
Model of Capital Utilization
θ = 1.0 vs. θ = 0.0 -0.077 -0.089 0.012
θ = 2.0 vs. θ = 0.0 -0.113 -0.124 0.011
θ = 2.0 vs. θ = 1.0 -0.035 -0.035 ~0
Table 2: The welfare cost of countercyclical taxes in model without government debt
(values are in percentage points)
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in the technological factor : acyclical taxes
(θ = 0, solid lines) and countercyclical taxes (θ = 1, dash lines).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1% increase in government spending: acyclical taxes
(θ = 0, solid lines) and countercyclical taxes (θ = 1, dash lines).
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Figure 3: Percent changes in aggregate volatility as the tax rate becomes more coun-
tercyclical (θ > 0) relative to acyclical taxes (θ = 0): basic model (circles) and model of
varying capital utilization (pluses). Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of
fluctuations around the long-run average
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